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We investigate how continental European unemployment can be reduced with-
out reducing unemployment beneﬁts and without reducing the net income of low-
wage earners. Lower unemployment replacement rates reduce unemployment, the
net wage and unemployment beneﬁts. A lower tax on labour increases net wages
and unemployment beneﬁts. Combining these two policies allows to reduce unem-
ployment without reducing net income of workers or of the unemployed. Such a
policy becomes self-ﬁnancing under realistic parameter constellations when taxes
are reduced only for low-income workers.
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1 Introduction
Many European countries are still struggling with high unemployment rates. Suﬃciently
many analysts agree on two facts: Unemployment is heavily concentrated among low-skill
individuals and demand for low-skill individuals could be increased by reducing their labour
costs. Labour costs can be inﬂuenced by the government directly by reducing taxes or social
security payments or indirectly by reducing unemployment payments in order to decrease
bargained wages. What should the government do?
The starting point of this paper is a certain concern for income levels at the lower end
of the income distribution. This could be justiﬁed on pure egalitarian grounds, on consider-
ations based on social welfare maximization (where income uncertainty would require 100%
insurance under risk aversion unless there is moral hazard), on eﬃciency arguments (less
inequality implies less crime; see e.g. Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002), for a survey) or on
political economy considerations (income eﬀects for the low-skilled or for insiders can be cru-
cial for the acceptance of reforms, see e.g. Grüner (2002)). Whatever the speciﬁc reasoning,
the question would always be whether unemployment can be reduced without decreasing the
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1net wage of the low skilled or net beneﬁts of the unemployed. This is the question of this
paper.
While reducing unemployment with higher income for everybody is obviously possible
from a theoretical perspective (with lump-sum taxation, any increase in eﬃciency can be
made Pareto-improving; see Roed and Strom (2002) for a more general discussion in second-
best worlds), can this also be achieved with the existing instruments a typical government
has at its disposal? Could Germany, to provide an example, have implemented labour mar-
ket reforms - diﬀerent from the 2005 Hartz IV reforms - having a more Pareto-improving
spirit? To ﬁnd an answer, we use the simplest theoretical framework which allows to treat
these issues. Our static economy, presented in section 2, produces one homogenous good by
employing high-skill and low-skill workers. Only the low-skilled are organized in unions.2
Unions ration labour and thereby cause unemployment. The government provides unem-
ployment beneﬁts, which ampliﬁes unemployment, and taxes labour. Taxation should be
understood in a broad sense and includes labour taxes per se and social security contribu-
tions. In equilibrium, there will be three groups: the high-skilled, employed low-skilled and
unemployed low-skilled.
The policy experiments we analyze imply a simultaneous reduction of unemployment
beneﬁts and the tax rate.3 The objectives of the experiments are to (i) reduce unemployment,
(ii) keep either the net-wage of a worker or the net payment to an unemployed worker at
its current level and (iii) preserve the current budget balance of the government, i.e. policy
reforms must be self-ﬁnancing. As instruments, we use the tax rate on labour and the
replacement rate.4 We also vary the progressiveness of labour taxation. A policy reform
that preserves net wages of workers will be called an equality-preserving reform (EPR),
a reform that preservers net payments to the unemployed will be called ambitious EPR.5
Given our institutional setup, a self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPR is Pareto-improving. We will
therefore use “self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPR” and Pareto-improving reform synonymously.
Section 3 shows that a reduction in payments to the unemployed and a contemporaneous
reduction in labour taxes reduces unemployment and keeps net wages of workers at the pre-
2When deﬁning skill by educational level, empirical support for this assumption is fairly overwhelming
(e.g. Schnabel (2002)). See Sørensen (1997), p. 238 for a similar assumption.
3The ﬁrst-best policy to restore eﬃciency in our economy would be to abolish unemployment beneﬁts and
trade unions. We take the existence of trade unions as given which, given constitutions of many countries, is
a realistic description of reality. For countries where unions play a less prominent role, we believe that our
comparative static results are robust to other reasons for unemployment like eﬃciency wages, insider-outsider
aspects or matching. The justiﬁcation for unemployment beneﬁts comes from some equality considerations
which could be modelled by a social welfare function (see e.g. Atkinson, 2000). We assume here that policy
makers can only undertake “marginal” reforms, given historically grown welfare and tax systems.
4 These are two of the measures which the empirical literature on the eﬀect of institutions on unemploy-
ment uses regularly (see e.g. Belot and van Ours (2004) for a recent contribution and the references therein).
Labour taxes are generally found to have a negative impact on unemployment while the replacement rate is
not always signiﬁcant. The duration of unemployment payments, however, is highly signiﬁcant. As we use a
static model, we view our theoretical replacement rate as a joint present-value measure of the level and the
length of unemployment payments. See the conclusion for further discussion.
5Our objective is to keep welfare of individuals at certain levels that are not aﬀected by some reform. In
an envy-free non-growing world (which we model), this requires constant net income and is independent of
other individuals’ welfare. Hence, we somewhat misuse the term ’equality’ as equality is a relative concept
and we are analysing absolute levels.
2reform level. Reducing the replacement rate increases employment and both the gross and
the net wage fall. As in our institutional setup the labour tax has no eﬀect on the gross
wage, the tax can be reduced such that the fall of the net wage is just compensated.6 In
some cases, depending on parameter values, an EPR is also self-ﬁnancing.
Needless to say that an EPR generally hurts the unemployed: the reduction in the labour
tax is designed to compensate workers for lower net wages. The unemployed are directly
aﬀected by the reduction in the replacement rate whose eﬀect on unemployment payments
is usually not compensated for by lower taxation. Falling net payments to the unemployed
c o u l db ea v o i d e db yr e d u c i n gt a x e so nl a b o u re v e nf u r t h e r .A na m b i t i o u sE P Rw o u l dr e s u l t .
When analyzing the eﬀects of EPRs and ambitious EPRs in section 4, they are self-
ﬁnancing only in “rare cases”. EPRs are generally self-ﬁnancing for a larger set of parameters
characterizing the share of skilled workers in the work force and the pre-reform tax rate. Am-
bitious EPRs often require implausible parameter assumptions in order to be self-ﬁnancing.
Policy reforms that are based on broad tax reductions in order to alleviate net-wage losses
following cuts in replacement rates are therefore diﬃcult to be put in place.
We therefore extend policy options in section 5 by allowing to reduce labour taxes only
for the low-skilled and keeping them at the pre-reform level for high-skilled workers. It turns
out that with this way of introducing more progressiveness in taxation, the EPR is always
self-ﬁnancing and that the ambitious EPR is self-ﬁnancing for realistic parameter values.
Pareto-improving reforms are possible.
We ﬁnally ask whether our policy proposals preserve existing relative net wages. This
is important as we would like to avoid that incentives to accumulate human capital (even
though not explicitly modelled) decrease. We ﬁnd that a self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPR
increases, under realistic parameter values, net-wage inequality. Hence, incentives to invest
in education are preserved under Pareto-improving polices.
The paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, it is in the spirit of the liter-
ature which analyses the eﬀects of tax reforms on unemployment in imperfectly competitive
labour markets, see for example Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) who analyze tax progression,
Kolm (2000) who analyses the tax structure in an economy with home production or, more
recently Kleven and Sørensen (2004) who model tax shifts in a dual labour market. All these
models derive employment and welfare eﬀects of fairly sophisticated tax reforms. Contrast-
ing this, our tax reform is simpler, but it is combined with a reform of the beneﬁts y s t e m .
This allows us to achieve multiple objectives: Reduce unemployment while keeping income of
certain groups constant.7 Technically speaking, we undertake a comparative static analysis
under equality constraints. These constraints were not explicitly analyzed in previous work.
They are, however, central for many policy makers.
Second, our paper is related to the literature which models proposals that aim at pre-
serving certain minimum incomes without causing too strong eﬃciency losses. Most of these
proposals were developed for countries like the US where the institutional background diﬀers
from Europe. The most well-known is probably the negative income tax (NIT) proposal go-
ing back to Friedman (1962). Its main objective is to provide low-income workers with some
6An analysis of other institutional setups was undertaken in Lingens and Wälde (2006). Due to space
constraints, they are not presented here. See also footnote 14.
7Lommerud et al. (2004) discuss optimal taxation when the policy maker is inequality averse. This is
the only goal which tax policy must achieve since there is no unemployment in the economy.
3guaranteed basic income without reducing incentives to work.8 An alternative approach is
a wage-subsidy to workers or to ﬁrms (for example Snower (1994) or Phelps (1994, 1997)),
known as Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC).9
The NIT or EITC proposals are sometimes applied to continental European countries.
Unemployment could be reduced without increasing inequality, the argument at least im-
plicitly goes, if on the one hand, the institutional background in, say, France, Germany and
Italy is changed, i.e. if e.g. bargaining power of unions is reduced, and, on the other hand,
if wage subsidies or negative income taxes are introduced. Such an approach has several dis-
advantages, however. First, it is politically not credible; individuals proposing a reduction
in union power are typically not those who favour certain minimum net-wage levels. Second,
while some institutions would be removed, new institutions would have to be created (apart
from countries that already have e.g. certain forms of subsidies to low-wage earners). On
a continent caught by many institutional details, this is not desirable. Further, as Snower
(1994) and Phelps (1994) write themselves, these proposals are not necessarily equality pre-
serving and the question of self-ﬁnancing has not been investigated.10 We therefore believe
that it is useful to preserve the existing institutional setup in many European countries and
use existing instruments to reduce unemployment without increasing poverty.11
Af u r t h e ri m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence of our suggestion compared to the negative income tax
proposal is the view about the origins of unemployment. If a certain income is guaranteed
to individuals independently of whether they work, this is generally argued to create un-
employment at the lower wage income as it is not rational for agents to accept a job that
pays lower net income than, say, social welfare payments. While any increase in work incen-
tives at unchanged net-income is desirable, we think that unemployment caused by social
welfare payments is only part of the story. Only about 1/3 of the unemployed (e.g. in
Germany in 2004) had been unemployed for 1 year or more. The majority therefore receives
unemployment insurance payments and we capture this (in our view more relevant) type
of unemployment by rationing eﬀects of union wage setting (which is especially relevant for
Continental Europe).
Finally, the same concern for not reducing the welfare state in an inappropriate way is
shared by Atkinson (2000). He analyses the optimal size and structure of social transfers
when a country is subject to budgetary pressure and labour market shifts against unskilled
workers. He especially focuses on optimal reactions when societies diﬀer in their attitude to-
wards distribution (where examples are labeled “United States” and “Continental Europe”).
We do not employ (diﬀerent cases of) a social welfare function as he does but rather focus on
8A less expensive variety of the NIT proposal is the targeted NIT, where only a certain group falls under a
NIT scheme. This could be the long-term unemployed as in Jerger and Sperman (1997) or those participating
in the labour market as in Van der Linden (2004).
9Both concepts and their implementation in US welfare policy are presented by Moﬃtt (2003). An
analysis of which of these concepts is preferable from an optimal taxation perspective is provided by Saez
(2002). An overview over diﬀerent implementations of the Earned-Income Tax Credit in OECD countries is
provided by EEAG (2002).
10There is evidence that programs that provide tax incentives to increase employment can be self-ﬁnancing
indeed, see Michalopoulosa, Robins and Card (2005). Even though this is micro-economic evidence, it
suggests that the search for self-ﬁnancing reforms on the aggregate level is worth being undertaken.
11Unemployment in European countries is certainly also due to eﬃciency wage aspects. The eﬀect of
low-wage subsidies in such a framework is analysed in Hoon and Phelps (2003), sect. 2.
4an EPR or of an ambitious EPR. This can be viewed as examples for what he calls “Rawlsian
government”.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Technology
Imagine an economy where an aggregate technology is used for producing a consumption
good. Factors of production are high-skilled and low-skilled labour. The two groups of labour
can be deﬁned according to educational achievement or their labour income. The aggregate
technology is given by
Y = F (H,L), (1)
where F (.) h a sc o n s t a n tr e t u r n st os c a l e . F i r m sa c tu n d e rp e r f e c tc o m p e t i t i o na n dt h e i r
implicit labour demand functions are
FL(H,L)=wL,F H (H,L)=wH, (2)
where gross factor rewards, including taxes and social security contributions, are wH and
wL.
Most of the time, we work with a CES production function. Normalizing a TFP measure
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There are two types of households. The high-skill households and the low-skill households.
Labour supply of the high-skilled is determined by utility maximization. Their preferences
are captured by U = U (C,H),w h e r eU (.) has the usual properties. The budget restriction
of such a household is (1 − τH)wHH = C.T h e r ea r eLs households that are less skilled and
their preferences depend on consumption only; employment L is determined by unions and
will be presented in the next subsection.12
12An earlier draft had endogenous labour supply of low-skilled in addition to union labour rationing. While
principles remained the same, tractability became much more diﬃcult.
5Utility maximizing labour supply of highly-skilled is determined, apart from parameters,
by net wages only. It can be expressed by an implicit human-capital supply curve ws
H with
the tax on high-skill income and human capital as arguments,
H = H ((1 − τH)wH) ⇔ wH = w
s
H (τH,H). (6)
Assuming a CES utility function of the form U =
³
γCλ +( 1− γ)(T − H)
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Human capital supply increases in the net wage when 0 <λ<1 and decreases when λ<0.
In what follows, we will always assume an upward sloping supply curve for human capital,
i.e. 0 <λ<1.
With a CD example like U = Cγ (T − H)
1−γ , human capital supply is ﬁx (app. 8.1),
H = γT. (8)
2.3 Unions
Low-skill individuals are organized in unions. Unions operate at the level of a sector or
ﬁrm i. The objective of the unions is to maximize net labour income of its members in
excess of alternative income a worker would earn in case of employment in other ﬁrms or
unemployment. Union preferences can be expressed by (1 − τL)wiLi+Bi [Mi − Li],w h e r ewi
is the gross wage of low-skill workers in sector i and Bi and Mi denote alternative income and
the number of members, respectively. Taking Bi and Mi as parametric, the objective function
can be expressed in the more simple form ui = Li (wi)[(1− τL)wi − Bi]. Maximization
subject to labour demand in sector i similar to (2) yields (app. 8.2) the usual markup of the
net wage over alternative income13,




















Alternative income Bi of workers is given by income from other sectors or from unem-
ployment beneﬁts b when not employed. Assuming identical probabilities for a worker not
employed in i to ﬁnd work in another sector s or to become unemployed, alternative income
amounts to Bi = Σs
j=1 (1 − τL)wj
Lj
Ls +bLs−L
Ls . In a symmetric equilibrium, where every ﬁrm
and every union behaves the same, the alternative income is given by







≡ (1 − τL)wL[1 − u]+bu, (11)
13This markup expressions requires a labour demand elasticity that is larger than unity, ηL > 1. This is
due to the monopoly union setup. More elaborate approaches to unions than this simple right-to-manage
model exist. Again, we believe that our main results are valid for other speciﬁc a t i o n sa sw e l l .
6where the second equality deﬁnes the unemployment rate u of low-skilled.
To determine the unemployment rate, we need the wage setting curve of the unions. This
curve shows the wage the unions will set as a function of low-skill employment, hence as a
function of the overall low-skill labour market situation. Plugging (11) into (9) gives the
general wage setting curve,
(1 − τL)wL =( 1− η
−1
L )
−1 ((1 − τL)wL [1 − u]+bu). (12)
The unemployment beneﬁt system in this paper is modelled as a “net-Bismarck” sys-
tem. This system is the most prevalent institutional setting in OECD countries. This is
also the system where we can present our central argument in the most straightforward
way.14 In “net-Bismarck” systems, unemployment beneﬁts are a ﬁxed fraction ζ (which is
the replacement rate) of the net wage in the economy,
b = ζ [1 − τL]wL. (13)
Inserting b into (12) gives the wage setting curve
(1 − ζ)u = η
−1
L . (14)
For later purposes, we compute the demand elasticity ηL for our CES and CD technolo-
gies. When we assume unions to take H as parametric, we compute η
−1
L from the CES
version of (2) and get (app. 8.3)15
η
−1
L =( 1− θ)
β
β +( 1− β)(L/H)
θ. (15)
As 0 <H / L<∞,η
−1
L is bounded by 0 <η
−1
L < 1 − θ. Note that θ<1 from (4). For the
Cobb-Douglas case, the (inverse) labour demand elasticity is (app. 8.3), considering again
H as parametric for the union,
η
−1
L = β. (16)
This is a special case of (15) for θ =0 .
3 Equilibrium analysis of EPRs
3.1 Equilibrium and comparative statics
We now analyze the unemployment equilibrium in the economy. Market equilibrium for
highly skilled individuals follows from the demand function (2) and the supply function (6)
14Unemployment beneﬁts in OECD countries are computed in at least three diﬀerent ways. One can
distinguish between institutional setups that can be called Beveridge system (unemployment payments are
wage independent), net-Bismarck system (unemployment payments are proportional to net wages) and gross-
Bismarck systems (unemployment payments are proportional to gross wages). Following OECD (2002, tab.
2.2 and 2.3), Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the USA have a predominantly net-
Bismarck system, Austria, Japan and Portugal have a gross-Bismarck system and Australia, Ireland, New
Z e a l a n da n dt h eU Kh a v eaB e v e r i d g es y s t e m .T h ea n a l y s i sp e r f o r m e dh e r ef o rt h en e t - B i s m a r ks y s t e mi s
performed also for the gross-Bismarck and Beveridge systems in Lingens and Wälde (2006).
15When computing the demand elasticity ηL, we take H as parametric: the union neglects the eﬀects of
its wage setting on employment of high-skilled but does take into account output eﬀects through changes in
employment of low-skilled.
7or (7). The labour-demand equation for low-skilled workers is given by (2) and the wage
setting curve is (14). Reproducing all three equations here gives
FH (H,L)=w
s
H (τH,H),F L (H,L)=wL, (1 − ζ)u = η
−1
L . (17)
This system determines high-skill employment H, low-skill employment L and the gross wage
wL for low-skilled (noting that u ≡ (Ls − L)/Ls by deﬁnition and ηL is either a constant
or a function of H and L - see (15) and (16)). These equilibrium quantities depend on the
replacement rate ζ and the tax τH for high-skill wages.
We focus on labour taxation and the replacement rate in our policy analysis. When we
do a comparative static analysis, totally diﬀerentiating gives after some steps (app. 9)
dH = −


















































































The abbreviation a1 captures the eﬀect of taxation on the supply of human capital, a2
captures the change of (the inverse of) the wL wage elasticity of labour demand with respect
to employment L. In analogy to η
−1
L in (10), η
−1
H is the inverse of the wH wage elasticity of
human capital demand. The supply elasticity of human capital is denoted by  H.
CD-utility CD-technology general
a1 0 > 0
a2 0 ≷ 0 for σ ≶ 1
 H 0
Table 1 Parameter implications for special Cobb-Douglas cases
Table 1 shows special cases for the above system (17). When human capital supply is
completely inelastic as in (8), then a1 =  H =0 : labour income does not have any impact on
human capital supply. When the technology is Cobb-Douglas, demand elasticities ηH and
ηL are constant and a2 =0 . Further, the determinant N is unambiguously positive.
Generally speaking, the sign of a1 is non-negative (for upward-sloping human capital
supply) and the sign of a2 is positive if the elasticity of substitution σ between factors of
8production is smaller than unity and negative for σ>1 (cf. app. 9). In general, the sign of
N is ambiguous as well. When a2 is not too negative, N is positive.16
unemployment net wage (1 − τL)wL beneﬁts b
τH CDCD 00 0
general +(1) −−
τL CDCD/ general 0 −−
ζ CDCD ++ +
general +(1) +(1) +(1)
Table 2 : General equilibrium eﬀects of taxation and the replacement rate
(1) An elasticity of substitution σ between H and L smaller than one (i.e. a2 > 0)i sa
suﬃcient condition
A summary of our comparative statics results is in tab. 2. It covers the eﬀects of the two
policy instruments beneﬁt replacement rate ζ and taxation τL and τH on unemployment,
the net wage and beneﬁt payments. We focus on two polar cases, the simplest one where
both the technology and the utility function of high skilled are of the Cobb-Douglas type
(CDCD) and the general case. The discussion below covers some intermediate cases as well.
• The eﬀects of taxation
These analytical results are illustrated in ﬁg. 1 which plots low-skill labour on the
horizontal and wages on the vertical axis. It shows the labour demand curve marked by wL,
the corresponding net-wage curve (1 − τL)wL and the beneﬁtc u r v eζ [1 − τL]wL.T h ew a g e
setting curve is the vertical line. When the technology is CD as in (5), a2 =0and (19) shows
that employment is not aﬀected by taxation τL of low-skilled. Even when employment of
high-skilled H changes due to a variation in τH, this only shifts the labour demand curve wL
(and the other two curves below wL)i nﬁg. 1 but not the vertical wage setting curve. When
human capital supply is constant as in (8), due to e.g. a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
a1 =  H =0as well and taxation by (20) does not aﬀect gross wages either. Hence, only net
wages and beneﬁtp a y m e n t sa r ea ﬀe c t e db yt a x a t i o ni nt h i sC D C Dc a s e .
In more general cases for positive a1 and a2, (18) to (20) show that a higher tax τH on
high-skill wages decreases employment of low- (and high)-skill individuals and, due to fewer
high-skilled, also the gross wage for low-skilled. The net wage and beneﬁtp a y m e n t st h e r e f o r e
also fall. Note that the negative employment eﬀect for low-skilled due to taxation τH results
from the change in the inverse demand elasticity η
−1
L i n( 1 5 )w h i c hi nt u r ni sc a u s e db ya
lower equilibrium high-skilled employment.17 When a2 is negative (and the determinant N
still positive), the employment eﬀects for low-skilled change, but the eﬀect on the gross and
thereby net wage and beneﬁts remain unchanged.
16As equation (A.13) in the appendix shows, a2 (θ) is bounded from below. It intersects the horizontal θ
line at θ =0and θ =1 . It approaches plus inﬁnity for θ going to minus inﬁnity. This shows that certain
parameter restrictions would suﬃce to obtain a positive determinant.
17Lower employment of L, however, moves η
−1
L in the opposite direction as can be seen e.g. from (15).
The overall eﬀect on the position of the wage setting line in ﬁgure 2 remains a shift to the left as could be
seen from totally diﬀerentiating (15).
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Figure 1 : The labour market for low-skilled workers
While the very weak link between taxation and low-skill employment is clearly due to
the fact that individual labour supply is ﬁx, it stresses the role of institutional arrangements
in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in employment-taxation elasticities.
• Replacement rate
The eﬀects of the replacement rate are more straightforward from (18) to (20). As
long as a2 ≥ 0, a higher replacement rate ζ increases the gross wage, reduces employment
of low-skilled and thereby also employment of high-skilled. The net wage increases and
beneﬁt payments increase because of the increase in the gross wage and directly through the
increase of the replacement rate. With a negative a2, results remain unchanged as long as
the determinant remains positive. Figure 1 illustrates the case of a reduction of ζ and shows
how the shift of the wage setting curve to the right increases employment at lower gross and
net wages.
3.2 How to preserve equality
Given the comparative static results obtained so far, an employment increasing and equality-
preserving tax reform seems straightforward. A lower replacement rate shifts the wage
setting curve to the right and increases employment at lower gross wages.18 Net wages and
unemployment beneﬁts fall as well, requiring a reduction in labour taxation for low-skilled.
If this reduction is only suﬃciently strong (at the risk of ending up with negative taxation),
more employment goes hand in hand with unchanged net wages or beneﬁtp a y m e n t s . W e
18Lowering the replacement rate increases employment but not necessarily welfare. While this is well-
understood in models where employment paths are uncertain and unemployment beneﬁts play an insurance
role, this is also true here: A social welfare function that aggregates utilities of the high-skilled and the
unskilled workers plus the unemployed would require that in a social optimum marginal utilities of the
unskilled must not be too high, i.e. their consumption levels, determined by the replacement rate, must not
be too low.
10deﬁne a reform to be equality-preserving (EPR) if the net-wage does not decrease as a
consequence of this reform,
d[(1 − τL)wL] ≥ 0. (23)
We will talk about an ambitious EPR when the reform keeps unemployment beneﬁts un-
changed or increases them,
db = d[ζ [1 − τL]wL] ≥ 0. (24)
• Implementation of the EPR
The equality constraint (23) can best be illustrated by a iso-netwage curve depicted in
the policy space (ζ,τ).19 We assume here that labour taxes are ﬂat, τH = τL ≡ τ.They can
therefore be reduced for high-skilled and low-skilled only simultaneously. Section 5 treats
the progressive tax case, where only τL is reduced.
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Figure 2 : Iso-netwage and iso-beneﬁt curves in the policy space
The iso-netwage curve draws combinations of ζ and τ w h e r et h en e tw a g er e m a i n su n -
changed. By using (20) in (23) gives, assuming again a suﬃciently large a2, (cf. app. 9.2)








wL (1 − ζ)L−1
s + wLN
dζ. (25)
As N>0 for a2 not too small, the slope of the iso-netwage curve is positive and we obtain
the following ﬁgure. Note that the concept of these curves is identical to iso-cost or iso-
output curves. While the latter shows by how much one factor of production needs to be
increased at unchanged output when the other factor of production is marginally decreased,
the iso-net wage curve shows by how much taxes need to be decreased at unchanged net
wages when the replacement rate is marginally decreased.
Summarizing, any policy reform that starts from the current policy (ζ0,τ0) lowers net
wages when moving into the non-shaded area. Remaining on the iso-netwage curve keeps
net wages constant and moving into the shaded area increases net wages.
19See Fig. 2 in Atkinson (2000) which also depicts the policy space.
11• Implementation of the ambitious EPR
A more ambitious EPR changes ζ and τ such that unemployment beneﬁts (13) do not
decrease. When we compute (24) with (20), we obtain (cf. app. 9.2)
db = d[ζ [1 − τL]wL] ≥ 0 ⇔ dτ ≤
[1 − τ]wLN/ζ +[ 1− τ]uη
−1
L




wL (1 − ζ)L−1
s
dζ. (26)
Compared to the iso-netwage curve (25), we have an additional term, [1 − τL]wLN/ζ in the
numerator. As N is positive, however, the slope remains positive and, as the denominator is
unchanged, the slope is larger. This is captured in the policy space in ﬁg. 2 by the dashed
iso-beneﬁt line. This means that taxes need to fall faster given a certain decrease in the
replacement rate if beneﬁts are to be kept constant.
Looking again at ﬁg. 1 illustrates why keeping net income of the unemployed constant
is more ambitious than preserving constant net wages: A reduction in ζ not only shifts the
wage setting curve to the right but also the beneﬁtc u r v eζ [1 − τL]wL down. Hence, a
tax-reduction must be much stronger in order to keep ζ [1 − τL]wL at its pre-reform level.
4T o w a r d s s e l f - ﬁnancing reforms
The previous analysis provided suggestions for policy reforms that reduce unemployment
without reducing net income of workers or the unemployed. We did not analyze the eﬀects
of a joint change in the replacement rate and taxation on the government’s budget balance.
Needless to say that this eﬀect is of crucial importance for the political feasibility.
Our proposals are constructed such that they have the potential to be self-ﬁnancing. An
EPR (and an ambitious EPR) consists of two components: a reduction in the replacement
rate and a reduction in labour taxation. The reduction in labour taxation decreases tax
revenue of the government while a reduction in the replacement rate reduces government
expenditure. The ﬁrst eﬀect is a negative one for the government budget, the second one
is positive. In principle, they could cancel out.20 Clearly, only a reform that reduces un-
employment, that does not reduce net-income of any agent and that does not increase the
government’s budget deﬁcit is a Pareto-improving reform.
4.1 The government budget and self-ﬁnancing conditions
Policy reforms are self-ﬁnancing when the government budget does not deteriorate due to the
reform. To ﬁn do u tw h e t h e rt h i si st h ec a s e ,w es t a r tf r o mt h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t
B = τY − bU = τY − ζw
n
LU. (27)
The number of unemployed is denoted by U, the net wage by wn
L and taxes are ﬂat, τH =
τL ≡ τ, an assumption to be relaxed again in the next section.
20We do assume (and even show for one example in app. 10.2) that we are on the “correct side” of the
Laﬀer curve, i.e. d(τY)/dτ > 0. While lower taxation might lead to more employment, we do not assume
that this increase in employment and the implied increase in tax income would overcompensate the losses
due to a lower tax rate. It is the decrease in the replacement rate and the induced eﬀect of less spending
(leaving more employment apart) that might compensate reduced tax income.
124.1.1 The EPR condition
When we want to perform an EPR and assume that human capital supply is inelastic, i.e.
the high-skilled have a CD utility function, the equality constraint (23) imposes a certain
relationship between a change in the replacement rate and the tax rate,
d[(1 − τ)wL]=0⇔ (1 − τ)dwL = wLdτ
⇔ (1 − τ)
wL
ζ











When diﬀerentiating, we used the fact that in the net-Bismarck case with equations (2) and
(14), the gross wage is only a function of ζ and not a function of the tax rate as long as human
capital supply is ﬁxed (see Lingens and Wälde (2006) for a treatment of the gross-Bismarck
and the Beveridge system). The equality constraint simply says that when the replacement
rate is decreased, the tax must be decreased as well by the amount (1 − τ)ζ
−1ηζ > 0 to keep
the net wage constant. An EPR is then self-ﬁnancing when the diﬀerential of the government
budget, taking this required decrease in taxation, captured by constraint (28), into account,
is non-negative.
Observing that dwn
L =0 , the diﬀerential of the budget constraint is
















where we use, similar to above, that in the net-Bismarck case output through labour and
through the gross wage wL is only a function of ζ as long as high-skilled supply is ﬁxed.





































The eﬀe c to fap o l i c yr e f o r mt h a tc h a n g e sζ and τ on the budget is now a function of the
change in ζ only. The change in τ was replaced by the relationship between dτ and dζ,
imposed by the equality constraint (28). An EPR is self-ﬁnancing when dB ≥ 0 as a result
of dζ < 0. This requires the expression in brackets (.) to be negative.
This equation shows various channels through which a policy reform acts. The ﬁrst two
expressions show the change in income of the government, the last two expressions show
changes in expenditure. An increase (decrease) in the replacement rate increases (decreases)
expenditure because more (less) is paid per unemployed person (given a constant net wage),
the wn
LU term, and because the gross wage increases (decreases), the last term. An increase
(decrease) in the replacement rate also decreases (increases) output and thereby reduces
13(increases) tax income, the second term. Finally, given our equality constraint (28), a higher
(lower) replacement rate requires higher (lower) taxation and therefore leads to an increase
(decrease) in tax income, the ﬁrst term. We therefore have three negative terms and one
positive term within the brackets.
4.1.2 The ambitious EPR condition
If we want to perform an ambitious EPR, we need to replace the iso-net wage constraint
(28) by the iso-beneﬁt constraint (24), db ≥ 0. The policy constraint implied by an invariant
beneﬁti s




where again, as in (28), the diﬀerential of wL used the fact that in the net-Bismarck case











dζ = ζdτ. (32)
The diﬀerential of the budget (27) now reads instead of (30) dB = τdY +Yd τ−bdU as
b is constant by policy design. The subsequent steps remain unchanged and we obtain















This means we only “lose” the term −wn
LUdζ. The economics behind this eﬀe c ti st h a tt h e
governmental budget cannot take advantage of lower payments to the unemployment after
the reform as was the case in the previously analyzed case. But this in turn implies that
ceteris paribus the condition for the funded, ambitious EPR to be successful becomes harder
to fulﬁl.



















This equation nicely contrasts the condition for the funded reform to hold in the case in which
o n l yt h en e tw a g eh a sb e e nk e p tc o n s t a n t . F i r s t l y ,t h e r ei sa na d d i t i o n a lt e r mi nt h ep a r t
w h i c hd e p i c t st h er e v e n u ed e c l i n ed u et ot h ed e c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t e .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h e
tax rate has to decrease by a larger amount to keep the unemployment income constant than
it was the case in the previous section. Secondly, the expenditure saving eﬀect (depicted by
the second term) is smaller than before. This is because only the employment decrease leads
to less governmental expenditure not the decrease of the unemployment payment as before
(by deﬁnition). Again, an ambitious EPR is self-ﬁnancing, i.e. it is a Pareto-improving
reform, when dB ≥ 0 as a result of dζ < 0.
144.2 The EPR
Let us now analyze the EPR condition (31) in more detail for the CDCD case21.W ed e r i v ei n
a p p .1 0 . 1as u ﬃcient (and necessary) condition for the tax rate τ and the parameter β from
the CD technology (5) under which an EPR is self-ﬁnancing. This condition guarantees that
the derivatives in (31) are negative, i.e. a decrease in ζ (which decreases unemployment) - at













Figure 3 Minimum tax rates for self-ﬁnancing
Fig. 3 plots (34) as the thick line in its equality version, i.e. τ =2− β
−1.P a r a m e t e r
combinations which lie on or above the thick line imply a self-ﬁnancing EPR: The higher the
tax rate and the lower β, the more likely self-ﬁnancing becomes. Note that this condition
is independent of ζ and thereby independent of the unemployment in the economy under
consideration.22
This ﬁgure also shows that wage subsidies could also be self-ﬁnancing: if we think of low-
income groups that do not pay taxes and whose social-security contributions are also very
low, one might have to pay subsidies in order to preserve their pre-reform net income. If β is,
say, .2, the tax on labour could become negative and the reform would still be self-ﬁnancing.
Is this condition bounded to be fulﬁlled in practice? The parameter β captures in our
CDCD case both the inverse of the (absolute) demand elasticity of labour, η
−1
L = β from
(16), and the share of labour income going to the high-skilled (5). The demand elasticity
ηL is usually estimated to lie in the long-run at between .4 and .7 (Hamermesh, 1993, p.
272), maybe between .15 and .75 (Hamermesh, 1993, p. 135). This would require in our
speciﬁcation a β larger than unity which, given the production function (5) makes no sense.
We will therefore take the share of high-skill income in total labour income as interpretational
background for β. This share should be smaller than .5 and the condition would then always
be satisﬁed. Given the ambiguity on which interpretation to give for β, we do not put to
much emphasis on this result at this stage.
21Here and in what follows we restrict attention to the CDCD case where both the utility function of
high-skilled and the technology are of the Cobb-Douglas type.
22This follows from the fact that the rate of unemployment in net-Bismarck systems depends only on ζ.
154.3 The ambitious EPR
The condition (33) for the ambitious EPR to hold reads for the CDCD case (app. 10.3)
τ>1 −
(1 − β)βζ




The thin line in Figure 3 plots this condition for ζ =0 .4. This value is a rough guess of
the average replacement rate in net-Bismarck countries from OECD (2002, tab. 2.2 and
2.3) and with a tax rate of around .2 for the unemployed. What can be seen is that the
condition for the ambitious EPR is, for most of the parameter range of β, more restrictive
than the condition for the EPR. What is worse, the curve never falls below .5. It seems
therefore highly implausible that an ambitious self-ﬁnancing EPR is possible when taxes are
decreased for all skill groups.
5S e l f - ﬁnancing reforms
The analysis so far conﬁned itself to identical tax rates for all labour groups. We found
that self-ﬁnancing EPRs and self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPRs are possible only for certain
parameter constellations; in gross-Beveridge systems, an ambitious EPR is not possible at
all. This section therefore studies a more sophisticated policy change and investigates the
conditions under which self-ﬁnancing is possible when tax cuts are made only for low-income
groups.
5.1 Progressive taxation
One reason for potentially harmful eﬀects on the government budget is the fact that labour
taxation decreases for all groups of labour, whether skilled or unskilled, whether employed or
unemployed. If the objective is to create employment at unchanged net wages or beneﬁts, it
would be enough to reduce labour taxation only for the unskilled. We will therefore analyze
in this subsection the eﬀect of a more progressive tax system.
There are many ways how progressivity of a tax system can be modelled. We use a
very simple one where we reduce the tax rate for low-skilled and keep the tax rate for the
high-skilled unchanged.23 More progression therefore does not mean “taxing the rich” and
“ g i v i n gi tt ot h ep o o r ” .T h eh i g h - s k i l l e dh a v et h es a m et a xr a t e sb e f o r ea n da f t e rt h er e f o r m .
We will see, however, that high-skilled nevertheless beneﬁt from the reform through more
employment of the low-skilled.
5.1.1 The EPR
I nd e r i v i n gac o n d i t i o nf o ras e l f - ﬁnancing EPR, we follow the steps as in the previous
analysis. The budget is now expressed by B = τLwLL + τHwHH − ζwn
LU, where τH is
23While this is in a modelling sense simply a skill-speciﬁc linear tax schedule, it is intended to reﬂect rising
marginal tax rates in a world with many skill groups.
16constant. After various steps (cf. app. 11.1), we obtain as a condition, comparable to (34)
above,
τH > 1 − u − β
−1. (36)
As β is smaller than unity, this condition is always satisﬁed. Illustrating it as the thick line
for ζ = .2 gives ﬁg. 4. A reduction in the replacement rate can always be accompanied
by a reduction in taxation for low-skilled such that net wages remain unchanged and the
government deﬁcit is not increased. A self-ﬁnancing EPR is possible with more progressive
taxation.
Figure 4 Self-ﬁnancing conditions for an EPR and for ambitious EPRs
5.1.2 The ambitious EPR
Let us analyze whether keeping net beneﬁts constant can more easily be achieved as well
w h e no n l yt a x e sf o rl o w - s k i l l e da r er e d u c e d .W eo b t a i na so u rn e wc o n d i t i o n( a p p .1 1 . 1 )
τH > (1 − u)
µ






−1 (τL + ζ (1 − τL)). (37)
This condition is plotted in ﬁg. 4 three times as the thin lines with a pre-reform tax for
labour of τL = .4. The line to the left is obtained for ζ = .6, t h eo n ei nt h em i d d l eh a sζ = .4
and the one to the right has a ζ of .2. W es e eh e r ea g a i nt h a tas e l f - ﬁnancing ambitious
EPR is indeed more diﬃcult to implement than an EPR, as it requires a larger pre-reform
tax than a self-ﬁnancing EPR. For shares β of high-skill income in total labour income
that are low, τH needs to be suﬃciently large for self-ﬁnancing to work. If, however, β is
larger than .5, self-ﬁnancing ambitious EPRs are possible as well. Eﬃciency gains obtained
through lower replacement rates can be distributed by using the existing tax system among
all economic agents such that policy reforms do not only create eﬃciency gains but are even
Pareto improving.
175.2 Are incentives right?
The purpose of our policy proposal is to decrease unemployment without changing the ab-
solute situation of the low-skilled or the unemployed, respectively. Thus, we implement a
“policy vector” (ζ,τL) that either leaves the low-skill wage constant or even increases it.
One could be tempted to argue that this gives rise to a long-run incentive problem in the
economy. If the policy proposal decreases the net high-skill wage at invariant low-skill wages,
the incentive to invest into skill-formation will decline. This would distort the long-run evo-
lution of the economy in an unfavourable way. Although these dynamic considerations are
not modelled in this paper, we analyze whether our policy could generate these disincentive
eﬀects. We therefore analyze the eﬀects of our policy proposal on the relative net wage
(1 − τH)wH/[(1 − τL)wL].
In the EPR case, the net wage (1 − τL)wL is constant by construction and the tax on
wH is also held constant in the tax progression case. The gross wage for high-skilled wH goes
up as higher employment increases the marginal productivity of human capital. Hence, in
this case, incentives to invest in human capital are even improving.
In the ambitious EPR case, relative wages can be expressed by ζ (1 − τH)wH/[ζ (1 − τL)wL].
A tax-progression policy reform keeps the denominator constant and changes ζ and wH. The
change in the relative net wage is therefore
d
ζ (1 − τH)wH
ζ (1 − τL)wL
=
1 − τH
ζ (1 − τL)wL






Apparently, an ambitious EPR does not decrease the net wage ratio if the elasticity of
gross wages for human capital with respect to the replacement rate is larger than minus one.
Intuitively, one would expect this elasticity to be negative: A higher replacement rate implies
lower employment of low-skilled which decreases marginal productivity of high-skilled. The
question is, how strong the reaction of high-skill wages to low-skill unemployment is.











A st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sb e l o w5 0 % ,u/(1 − u) < 1. The replacement rate in net-
Bismarck countries is around .5 and therefore ζ/(1 − ζ) ≈ 1. As 1 − β<1 as well, we




dζ > −1 such that even the ambitious
EPR keeps incentives for human capital investment in place.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Can a reduction in unemployment originating from a reduction in the replacement rate or
unemployment beneﬁts be accompanied by changes in the tax system such that a reduction
of net income of low-income groups can be avoided? Two versions of constant low-income
are considered: On the one hand, we ask under which conditions an equality preserving
reform (EPR) can be implemented, i.e. a policy reform that reduces unemployment without
reducing the net-wage of low-skill workers. On the other hand, we analyze ambitious EPRs,
18i.e. policy reforms that also reduce unemployment but keep net-income of the unemployed
c o n s t a n t .W es h o wt h a tE P R sa sw e l la sa m b i t i o u sE P R sa r ep o s s i b l e .
When analyzing the budgetary requirements for the government, we ﬁnd that EPRs
are self-ﬁnancing for some parameter constellations. Ambitious EPRs, however, are hardly
self-ﬁnancing. The budgetary cost implied by the reduction in labour taxes required to
keep income of the unemployed at their pre-reform level are just too high and can not be
compensated by lower expenditure due to the reduced number of unemployed.
We therefore analyze the eﬀect of reducing tax rates only for low-income workers. This
implies a more progressive tax and social security contributions system and makes EPRs
always self-ﬁnancing. Ambitious EPRs also become much more likely to be self-ﬁnancing
- Pareto-improving unemployment reductions are possible. Finally, incentives to become
skilled are not distorted by more progressive tax systems - the ratio of net wages should actu-
ally increase when policies are implemented that reduce unemployment and keep net income
of the unemployed constant. Eﬃciency gains through lower unemployment can therefore be
distributed within existing system such that everybody beneﬁts from these eﬃciency gains.
One can think of various extensions of our approach. While we did show that self-
ﬁnancing ambitious EPRs and EPRs are possible in principle, more complex models than
the ones we used are required before reliable policy recommendations can be made. One
would need models that allow for serious calibration (as e.g. Sørensen, 1997) and detailed
comparison of e.g. real world unemployment rates and those predicted by the model. Other
forms of unemployment than trade union unemployment would be required for countries
where trade union density is not so high.
Modelling the duration of unemployment would be very interesting as well (for a recent
excellent overview and analysis, see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2002). Given that the replace-
ment rate is not always a highly signiﬁcant determinant of unemployment in empirical work
(see footnote 4), the joint eﬀect of the length of unemployment payments and of the re-
placement rate on unemployment could be better understood. From a policy perspective,
a dynamic approach would allow to jointly analyze negative income tax features and the
measures we propose.
These more elaborate models could then be used to see quantitatively by how much
taxes must fall in order to keep net income of various groups constant and by how much and
how fast (in a dynamic setup) the contemporaneous decrease in the replacement rate would
aﬀect unemployment. One could also investigate how endogenous labour supply decisions of
unskilled workers or the eﬀect of additional taxes help to fulﬁlt h es e l f - ﬁnancing objective.
If there was a, say, value-added tax in our model, less unemployment would cause higher
tax income directly because of higher employment (this channel is included in our analysis)
but also indirectly because of higher consumption and the implied value-added taxes. This
should generally allow to design self-ﬁnancing reforms more easily.
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